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Should the First Amendment Protect 
Against Right of Publicity Infringement 
Actions Where the Media is 
Merchandiser?  Say It Ain’t So, Joe 
Darren F. Farrington* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
A Sports Illustrated clock radio wakes you from a dream 
of quarterbacking for the Giants or Redskins or Forty-niners.  
The choice was yours playing “Madden NFL ‘97” for Su-
perNintendo.  You get out of bed, pull off your “NBA on 
NBC” T-shirt and New York Yankees’ “1996 World Series 
Champions” shorts, and go to the shower.  Later, after 
choosing a suit and dress shirt, you put on a Beatles’ Hard 
Day’s Night necktie and move to the kitchen for coffee in 
your Madison Square Garden mug.  At your doorstep, you 
pick up the morning newspaper.  The front page features a 
photo of your favorite sports star scoring the winning bas-
ket, or run, or touchdown in last night’s game.  A flyer falls 
from inside the paper advertising a poster-size reproduction 
of the front-page photo, available to the public for five dol-
lars. 
In the above scene, the clock, video game, T-shirt, shorts, 
necktie, coffee mug, and poster are all examples of product 
merchandise featuring popular figures, franchises, or trade 
names.1  Most of such merchandise is licensed by the figure, 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 1997.  Thanks to 
Katharine Loving, Suzanne Byrne, Peter Nesvold, Lisa Pollard, Mark Salzberg, 
Fr. Charles Whelan, and Susanne Goodwin for editing and encouragement.  This 
Note is dedicated to my mother and to my father for love and support through 
years of education.  See you later, Joe. 
1. See, e.g., Retail Sales of Licensed Sports Merchandise, By Product Category, U.S. 
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franchise, or owner of the name as a source of income.2  Your 
favorite sports star, however, might not be too happy about 
the poster.  Because a newspaper is marketing the poster, it 
might be granted First Amendment protection without the 
athlete’s consent or approval.3  Moreover, the newspaper’s 
poster might compete with similar posters licensed by the 
athlete, thereby decreasing sales and affecting the athlete, 
manufacturer, and merchandiser of the licensed products.4  
If such First Amendment protection attaches to the poster, T-
shirts and coffee mugs may soon fall out of newspapers too. 
The right which allows a public figure5 to control the 
commercial use of his or her name or likeness6 is the right of 
                                                                                                                                  
& Canada, 1995-1996, LICENSING LETTER, Mar. 1, 1997, available in WESTLAW, 
1997 WL 9041323 (indicating that among categories of merchandise are apparel, 
electronics, housewares, video games, gifts, and other novelties). 
2. Retail sales of licensed merchandise amounted to approximately $69.93 
billion in the United States and Canada in 1995.  1995 Shares of Licensed Product 
Retail Sales, U.S. & Canada, By Product Type, LICENSING LETTER, Jan. 1, 1996, avail-
able in WESTLAW, 1996 WL 8313137. 
3. The First Amendment allows the media certain uses of a person’s name 
or likeness in reporting newsworthy events and in promoting the media itself.  
See infra part I.C. 
4. See, e.g., Joe Montana and Dwight Clark Featured on Innovative Three-
Dimensional Sports Lithograph, BUS. WIRE, Dec. 12, 1991, available in WESTLAW, 
Allnewsplus File (announcing issue of a lithograph commemorating “The 
Catch,” “the most famous play in San Francisco 49er history”); Tom Graham, Hey 
There, Sports Fans!/From Home Plates to Helmet Phones, Furnishings for the Faithful, 
S.F. CHRON., Jan. 6, 1993, at 1Z1 (describing various licensed sports products).  
Sports properties accounted for approximately $13.787 billion in retail sales of 
licensed merchandise in the United States and Canada in 1996.  Retail Sales of Li-
censed Sports Merchandise, By Product Category, U.S. & Canada, 1995-1996, 
LICENSING LETTER, Mar. 1, 1997, available in WESTLAW, 1997 WL 9041323. 
5. Definition of the term “public figure” is explored more deeply in case law 
regarding defamation.  See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 
472 U.S. 749, 755-57 (1985); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 335-39 
(1974).  In a case involving the right of privacy, a California Court of Appeal 
found that a person is a public figure “to the extent that the public has a legiti-
mate interest in his doings, affairs or character.”  Werner v. Times-Mirror Co., 14 
Cal. Rptr. 208, 212 (Ct. App. 1961).  Of even more controversy in the area of pri-
vacy and publicity rights is the definition of the term “newsworthy.”  See infra 
part I.C.1. 
6. Although the general term “likeness” is used here for simplicity, state 
statutes differ on what specific representations are actionable.  Compare CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 3344(a) (West 1996) (“name, voice, signature, photograph or likeness”) 
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publicity.7  In several states, a codified right of publicity 
prohibits merchandising or advertising which uses a per-
son’s name or likeness without consent.8  In other states, the 
right is included in a codified right of privacy,9 or may be 
found in common law.10  All state rights of publicity, how-
ever, are twentieth-century developments11 and many re-
main unsettled.12 
Due to the continuing development of this area of law, 
both state and federal courts applying either statutory or 
common law publicity rights have sought guidance from 
less than analogous cases, and from opinions of other states 
and federal courts.13  For this reason, one court’s decision 
                                                                                                                                  
with N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 1996) (“name, portrait, picture or 
voice”).  The most extensive protection exists in Indiana, where the state statute 
defines the use of “personality” as “name; voice; signature; photograph; image; 
likeness; distinctive appearance; gestures; or mannerism.”  IND. CODE ANN. § 32-
13-1-6 (Burns 1995). 
7. The right was first named by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit, applying New York law, in Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing 
Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).  See infra notes 60-61 and accompany-
ing text (discussing development of the right of publicity).  For a comprehensive 
review of the law of publicity rights, see generally J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE 
RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY (1987 & Supp. 1996); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46-49 (1995). 
8. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344; IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-13-1-1 to -20.  For a 
complete list of states protecting the right of publicity, see infra note 52. 
9. See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS 
§§ 9-1-28 to -28.1 (1985 & Supp. 1996). 
10. See, e.g., Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (Ct. App. 
1983) (“common law cause of action for appropriation of name and likeness may 
be pleaded”).  But see Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc. 474 N.E.2d 580, 
584 (N.Y. 1984) (“plaintiff cannot claim an independent common-law right of 
publicity”). 
11. See infra part I.B. 
12. The New York Court of Appeals, for example, has yet to definitively rule 
on the assignability, transferability, or descendibility of publicity rights.  Compare 
Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 221 (2d Cir. 1978) (applying New 
York law) (“The identification of this exclusive right [of publicity] . . . as a trans-
ferable property right compels the conclusion that the right survives . . . death.”) 
with Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 584 n.2 (N.Y. 
1984) (“we need not consider whether the statute would also control assignment, 
transfer or descent of publicity rights”). 
13. See, e.g., Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 
641 (Ct. App 1995) (“we have been unable to locate any cases directly on point”); 
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may affect the scope of publicity rights in all jurisdictions of 
the United States.14 
In a 1995 California case, Montana v. San Jose Mercury 
News, Inc.,15 a California Court of Appeal affirmed a sum-
mary judgment holding that the Mercury News had a First 
Amendment right to reprint and sell poster-size prints of 
drawings and photographs of professional football player 
“Joe” Montana that had previously appeared in the newspa-
per’s pages.16  The court reasoned that the posters “reported 
on newsworthy events”17 and that a “newspaper has a con-
stitutional right to promote itself by reproducing its news 
stories.”18 
By upholding the summary judgment in Montana, the 
California courts did not allow finders of fact to consider 
whether the Mercury News’ posters were in fact advertising 
or a form of product merchandising.19  Moreover, by holding 
                                                                                                                                  
Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 220 (2d Cir. 1978) (“we have 
sought assistance from federal court decisions interpreting and applying New 
York law, as well as decisions from courts of other states”). 
14. No federal right of publicity exists.  For a discussion of such a proposed 
right, see generally J. Eugene Salomon, Jr., The Right of Publicity Run Riot:  The 
Case for a Federal Statute, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1179 (1987). 
15. 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639 (Ct. App. May 3, 1995), as modified, (May 30, 1995), 
review denied, (Aug. 17, 1995). 
16. Id.  For a more complete description of the posters, see infra text accom-
panying notes 162-69.  Under California law, affirmance of a summary judgment 
is appropriate only where “the appellate court [has] resolved[d] all doubts in fa-
vor of the party opposing the judgment.”  M.B. v. San Diego, 284 Cal. Rptr. 555, 
557 (Ct. App. 1991).  To do so, the court must “conduct[] a de novo examination 
to see whether there are any genuine issues of material fact or whether the mov-
ing party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter or law.”  Id.  According to 
the United States Supreme Court, applying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
a “genuine issue of material fact” exists where the issue “properly can be re-
solved only by a finder of fact because [it] may reasonably be resolved in favor of 
either party.”  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986). 
17. Montana, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 794. 
18. Id. at 796. 
19. See Joe Montana Loses Right of Publicity Lawsuit Against San Jose Mercury 
News Seeking Compensation for Newspaper’s Sale of Poster Reproductions of Its Pages 
Bearing His Name and Likeness, ENT. L. REP., Aug. 1995, available in LEXIS, News 
Library, Entrep File [hereinafter Joe Montana loses right] (noting that many com-
mentators consider posters to be more similar to toys or other products than to 
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that the posters were not a misappropriation of Montana’s 
name and likeness for merchandising purposes, the Califor-
nia courts have begged the question of whether the news 
media may merchandise any item, such as a T-shirt or coffee 
mug, containing newsworthy print or photographs.20  Such a 
reading of Montana may immunize the media from almost 
any claim against it based on the right of publicity. 
Titan Sports, Inc. v. Comics World Corp.,21 a 1989 case in 
which the Second Circuit Court of Appeals applied New 
York law, concerned a situation closely analogous to Mon-
tana.  There, the media defendants published large “fold-
out” posters of professional wrestlers within their maga-
zines’ pages.22  At issue was whether the trial court properly 
granted summary judgment where such posters might be 
considered merchandised products separate from the usual 
content of a magazine.23  The court ruled that a finder of fact 
must make that distinction.24 
This Note argues that courts should not grant the media 
First Amendment protection to merchandise products, in-
cluding posters, which appropriate without consent the 
names or likenesses of public figures.  Part I reviews the 
right of publicity as developed through case law and stat-
utes, focusing on the laws of New York and California.  Part 
II presents the facts and procedural history of the Montana 
                                                                                                                                  
newspapers, magazines, or books). 
20. Cf. id. (suggesting that the Mercury News’ posters are merchandised 
products).  To date, Montana has been cited in only two cases.  Abdul-Jabbar v. 
General Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 416 (9th Cir. 1996), distinguished Montana 
where General Motors used basketball legend Kareem Abdul-Jabbar’s former 
name, Lew Alcindor, in advertising.  Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 649 
(Ct. App. 1996), cited Montana only for the proposition that statutory and com-
mon law rights of publicity co-exist in California.  See infra part I.B.2.a (differen-
tiating California statutory and common law). 
21. 870 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1989), rev’g 690 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
22. Titan Sports, Inc., v. Comics World Corp., 690 F. Supp. 1315, 1317 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), rev’d, 870 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1989).  For a more complete descrip-
tion of the posters, see infra text accompanying notes 198-204. 
23. Titan Sports, 870 F.2d at 88-89. 
24. Id. at 89. 
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and Titan Sports decisions.  Part III defines issues that courts 
must address in cases where the media merchandises prod-
ucts.  Part III then analyzes the Montana decision of the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal, and, finally, proposes that the Cali-
fornia court should have applied the Second Circuit’s Titan 
Sports test to Montana.  Accordingly, this Note concludes that 
the First Amendment should not protect the media in mer-
chandising products that infringe upon a celebrity’s right of 
publicity. 
I. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
The right of publicity protects against the commercial25 
misappropriation of a person’s name or likeness26 without 
consent.27  Generally, the right benefits entertainers, athletes, 
and other celebrities who have developed well-known im-
ages with a commercial value.28  Many state statutes also 
provide for descendibility of the right.29 
 
25. See infra part I.B.1.b (discussing commercial use in New York law). 
26. See supra note 6 (explaining use of the term “likeness”). 
27. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995) (providing 
that “[o]ne who appropriates the commercial value of a person’s identity by us-
ing without consent the person’s name, likeness, or other indicia or identity for 
purposes of trade is subject to liability”). 
28. See, e.g., Shamsky v. Garan, Inc., 632 N.Y.S.2d 930 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (former 
professional baseball players); Titan Sports, Inc. v. Comics World Corp., 870 F.2d 
85 (2d Cir. 1989) (professional wrestlers); Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. 
Rptr. 342 (Ct. App. 1983) (actor); Cher v. Forum Int’l, Ltd., 692 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 
1982) (actress and entertainer); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 
433 U.S. 562 (1977) (“human cannonball”); Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing 
Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953) (professional baseball players).  In some 
jurisdictions, the right extends to non-celebrities.  See, e.g., Dora v. Frontline 
Video, Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 792 n.2 (Ct. App. 1993) (“Although there is a 
split of opinion among jurisdictions as to whether a ‘non-celebrity’ should have 
the right to sue for the commercial value of unpermitted use of personal identity, 
the case law in California assumes without discussion that the right exists.”). 
29. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 990(g) (West 1996) (separate statute providing 
for 50 year duration of a post-mortem right of publicity); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-13-
1-8 (Burns 1995) (100 years); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1104(a) (Michie 1995) (10 
years).  But see Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 584 
n.2 (N.Y. 1984) (“[W]e need not consider whether the statute would also control 
assignment, transfer or descent of the publicity rights.”).  For a discussion of the 
survivability of publicity rights, see J. Steven Bingman, A Descendible Right of 
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This part introduces the right of publicity.  First, this part 
briefly reviews the derivation and development of the right.  
Second, it focuses on the laws of New York and California, 
the two states in which right of publicity cases are most liti-
gated.30  Finally, this part presents the conflict between pub-
licity rights and the First Amendment, and the exceptions 
and defenses created thereby. 
A. Derivation from the Right of Privacy 
The right of publicity derives from the right of privacy, 
which itself is a modern development of tort law.31  In fact, 
not until the late nineteenth century did legal scholars con-
sider the enforceability of a right of privacy.32  Then, an 1890 
article by Samuel Warren and future Supreme Court Justice 
Louis Brandeis, in the fourth volume of the Harvard Law Re-
view, called for legal acknowledgment of the right “to be let 
alone.”33  Warren and Brandeis voiced the turn of the cen-
tury concern that “[i]nstantaneous photographs and news-
paper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of pri-
vate and domestic life”34 and advocated that “[p]olitical, 
                                                                                                                                  
Publicity:  Has the Time Finally Come for a National Standard?, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 933 
(1990); Andrew B. Sims, Right of Publicity:  Survivability Reconsidered, 49 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 453 (1981). 
30. See Paul Cirino, Advertisers, Celebrities, and Publicity Rights in New York 
and California, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 763, 768 (1994). 
31. See Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
203, 203-10 (1954). 
32. Id. 
33. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193, 193.  Warren and Brandeis cite to THOMAS M. COOLEY, COOLEY ON TORTS 
29 (2d ed. 1888), where Cooley used the phrase “to be let alone” in the general 
sense of being free from injury.  Warren & Brandeis, supra, at 195. 
 While the right of privacy is generally traced to Warren and Brandeis, they 
themselves review the history of the advocacy of privacy rights.  Id. at 195-96. 
In 1928, in a criminal law context, Justice Brandeis advocated the right “to be let 
alone” in a Supreme Court case reviewing the constitutionality, under the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments, of wiretapping.  Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 
478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
34. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 33, at 195.  Warren and Brandeis com-
mented: 
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of pro-
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social, and economic changes entail the recognition of new 
rights . . . .”35 
In 1903, because the New York Court of Appeals had re-
fused to recognize a right of privacy at common law,36 the 
state legislature became the first to codify such a right.37  The 
Court of Appeals later noted, “the statute was born of the 
need to protect the individual from selfish, commercial ex-
ploitation of his personality”38 and has repeatedly held that 
the right is entirely statutory in New York.39 
As developed through the twentieth century, the law of 
privacy has come to refer to a number of overlapping per-
sonal interests affiliated only by name and by the fact that 
each, in its essence, still involves the right “to be let alone.”40  
By mid-century, the right to privacy included causes of ac-
tion for “intrusion” into one’s private affairs; “disclosure” of 
one’s embarrassing private facts; publicity placing one in a 
“false light in the public eye;” and “appropriation,” usually 
                                                                                                                                  
priety and of decency.  Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and 
of the vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued with industry 
as well as effrontery.  To satisfy a prurient taste the details of sexual re-
lations are spread broadcast in the columns of the daily papers.  To oc-
cupy the indolent, column upon column is filled with idle gossip, which 
can only be procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle.  The inten-
sity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization, have 
rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under the re-
fining influence of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so 
that solitude and privacy have become more essential to the individual; 
but modern enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon his 
privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater than 
could be inflicted by mere bodily injury. 
Id. at 196. 
35. Id. at 193. 
36. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902) (refusing 
to grant relief to a plaintiff whose picture had been used without consent on 
flour boxes); see also William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 384-86 (1960) 
(reviewing statutory history of New York Civil Rights Law §§ 50-51). 
37. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51; see also Prosser, supra note 36, at 384-86. 
38. Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 107 N.E.2d 485, 487 (N.Y. 1952). 
39. See, e.g., Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 584 
(N.Y. 1984); Arrington v. New York Times Co., 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1321 (N.Y. 
1982); Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 107 N.E.2d 485, 487 (N.Y. 1952). 
40. Prosser, supra note 36, at 389. 
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for commercial advantage, of one’s name or likeness.41 
It is appropriation, the last of Prosser’s four rights of pri-
vacy, which further evolved into the protection provided by 
the right of publicity.42 
B. Right of Publicity Laws 
Before courts formally recognized the right of publicity, 
one New York Court of Appeals judge distinguished a pub-
lic figure’s claimed right of publicity from the right of pri-
vacy by noting that the “grievance here is not the invasion of 
his ‘privacy,’ privacy is the one thing he did not want, or 
need, in his occupation.”43  Hoping to gain or maintain ce-
lebrity status, right of publicity claimants therefore do not 
generally seek to enjoin the use of their name or likeness, but 
rather ask to be paid for that use.44  In contrast then to pri-
vacy rights, the right of publicity protects celebrities’ inter-
ests in the use of their names and images as a profitable 
property right.45 
Another distinction between privacy rights and the right 
of publicity is the states’ interest in protecting those rights.46  
While the right of privacy protects a private individual from 
 
41. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-652I (1977) (classify-
ing the right of privacy into Prosser’s four types).  Invasion of privacy, as a tort 
in at least one form, is now recognized, either in statute or common law, by 
nearly all United States jurisdictions.  MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 6.1[A], at 6-4 to 
-5. 
42. MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 1.5[D]-1.7, at 1-24 to -36. 
43. Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 107 N.E.2d 485, 489 (N.Y. 1952) (Desmond, 
J., concurring). 
44. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 
(1977) (“Petitioner does not seek to enjoin the broadcast of his performance; he 
simply wants to be paid for it.”); Gautier, 107 N.E.2d at 489 (noting that plaintiff’s 
“real complaint . . . is that he was not paid”). 
45. The classification of the right of publicity as a property right stems from 
a seminal article by Melville B. Nimmer.  Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Public-
ity, 19 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954); Floyd A. Gibson & Rachel M. Healey, The 
Right of Publicity Comes of Age, 23 AIPLA Q.J. 361, 365-66 (1995); see also Zacchini, 
433 U.S. at 573 (protecting “the proprietary interest of the individual in his act”). 
46. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573. 
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public exposure and embarrassment,47 the right of publicity 
protects a citizen’s investment in his image, and therefore is 
“closely analogous to the goals of patent and copyright law, 
focusing on the right of the individual to reap the reward of 
his endeavors and having little to do with protecting feelings 
or reputation.”48  Also analogizing the right of publicity to 
intellectual property interests, the United States Supreme 
Court, in its sole case addressing a state right of publicity, 
compared the right of publicity to the protection provided 
by unfair competition law.49  Establishing that the rationale 
for protecting the right of publicity is the “straightforward 
one of preventing unjust enrichment,” the Court reasoned 
that “[n]o social purpose is served by having the defendant 
get free some aspect of the plaintiff that would have market 
value . . . .”50  Therefore, those states which protect the right 
of publicity are likely to do so to encourage and reward an 
investment in one’s image and personality.51 
Currently, twenty-five states recognize the right of pub-
licity either in statute or through common law.52  Fifteen 
 
47. Prosser, supra note 36, at 392 (noting that the right of privacy has the 
“same overtones of mental distress as in defamation”). 
48. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573. 
49. Id. at 576.  For further discussion of Zacchini, see infra text accompanying 
notes 111-15. 
50. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576. 
51. Shamsky v. Garan, Inc., 632 N.Y.S.2d 930, 937 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (noting that 
the right of publicity protects “invested years of practice and competition in a 
public personality which eventually may reach marketable status”). 
52. MCCARTHY, supra note 7, §§ 6.1-.15, at 6-1 to -85 (compiling state com-
mon and statutory law); see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1996); Eastwood v. 
Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Ct. App. 1983) (recognizing California com-
mon law right); Jim Henson Prods. v. John T. Brady & Assocs., 867 F. Supp. 175 
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (deciding Connecticut common law); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08 
(West 1996); Genesis Publications, Inc. v. Goss, 437 So. 2d 169 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1983) (plaintiff relied solely on Florida common law); Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. 
v. Am. Heritage Prods., 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982) (Georgia common law); Ferger-
strom v. Hawaiian Ocean View Estates, 441 P.2d 141 (Haw. 1968) (labeling mis-
appropriation as Hawaii common law privacy right); Douglass v. Hustler Maga-
zine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985) (deciding Illinois common law); IND. CODE 
ANN. §§ 32-13-1-1 to -20 (Burns 1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170 (Michie 
1984); Cheatham v. Paisano Publications, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 381 (W.D. Ky. 1995) 
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states protect publicity rights statutorily,53 some through 
privacy statutes54 and others through legislation specifically 
aimed at protecting publicity rights.55  Common law is the 
sole protector of the right of publicity in ten states;56 an addi-
tional six states providing statutory protection recognize a 
common law right as well.57  These sixteen common law 
states include those whose own courts have recognized the 
right,58 and those in which federal courts, applying state law, 
have held that a state right exists.59 
                                                                                                                                  
(deciding Kentucky common law); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 214, § 3A (Law. Co-op. 
1986); Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983) 
(deciding Michigan common law); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 
(D. Minn. 1970) (deciding Minnesota common law); Haith v. Model Cities Health 
Corp., 704 S.W.2d 684 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (Missouri common law); NEB. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 20-201 to -211 (Michie 1991); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 597.770-.810 
(Michie 1994); Estate of Elvis Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981) 
(deciding New Jersey common law); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 
1996); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (review-
ing Ohio common law); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1448-1449 (West 1993); Gee 
v. CBS, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 600 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (deciding Pennsylvania common 
law); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-1-28 to -28.1 (1996); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1101 to -
1108 (1995); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 26.001-.015 (West 1996); Kimbrough v. 
Coca-Cola/USA, 521 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (recognizing appropria-
tion as Texas common law privacy right); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 45-3-1 to -6 (Mi-
chie 1993); Nature’s Way Prods., Inc. v. Nature-Pharma, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 245 (D. 
Utah 1990) (deciding Utah common law); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-40 (Michie 
1992); WISC. STAT. ANN. § 895.50 (West 1996); Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Sons, 280 
N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1979) (recognizing Wisconsin common law right). 
53. See supra note 52 (“statutory” states include California, Florida, Indiana, 
Kentucky, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Is-
land, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin). 
54. See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51; R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-1-28 to -28.1. 
55. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344; IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-13-1-1 to -20. 
56. See supra note 52 (“common law” states include Connecticut, Georgia, 
Hawaii, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, and Pennsyl-
vania). 
57. See supra note 52 (additional “common law” states include California, 
Florida, Kentucky, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin). 
58. See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. v. American Heritage Prods., 296 
S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982). 
59. See, e.g., Jim Henson Prods. v. John T. Brady & Assocs., 867 F. Supp. 175, 
189 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“I hold that Connecticut’s high court would recognize the 
right of publicity.”). 
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1. New York 
a. Development of the Right of Publicity 
A common law right of publicity, as an enforceable ac-
tion independent of the right to privacy, was first recognized 
in a federal court in the Southern District of New York in 
1953.60  There, applying New York law, the court held that, 
“in addition to and independent of that right of privacy 
(which in New York derives from statute), a man has a right 
in the publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to 
grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture . . . .”61 
A common law cause of action for the protection of pub-
licity rights continued in New York until 1984, when the 
state’s high court held that the right of publicity, like the 
right of privacy,62 is protected solely by statute in New 
York.63  The court found that because the privacy rights stat-
utes, New York Civil Rights Law sections 50 (“section 50”)64 
and 51 (“section 51”),65 are “not limited to situations where 
the defendant’s conduct has caused distress to a person who 
wishes to lead a private life,” relief in publicity right actions, 
as in privacy actions, is limited to the statutes.66 
Sections 50 and 51 continue to protect both privacy rights 
and publicity rights in New York.67  Although both sections 
 
60. Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d 
Cir. 1953). 
61. Id. 
62. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (indicating that the right of pri-
vacy is solely statutory in New York). 
63. Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580 (N.Y. 1984). 
64. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 1996). 
65. Id. § 51 (McKinney 1996). 
66. Stephano, 474 N.E.2d at 584. 
67. See J. Thomas McCarthy, The Spring 1995 Horace S. Manges Lecture—The 
Human Persona as Commercial Property:  The Right of Publicity, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. 
& ARTS 129, 134 (1995) (“[T]he New York Court of Appeals sees the right of pub-
licity as a mere ‘aspect’ of the New York statutory law of privacy.”) 
For the past several years, legislation has been proposed which would create a 
statutory right of publicity in New York, including a posthumous right.  See Leo-
nard M. Marks & Robert P. Mulvey, Celebrity Rights Law Needed in New York, N.Y. 
L.J., Nov. 6, 1995, at 1; Alan J. Hartnick, The History of the Right of Publicity in New 
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apply to the same acts of a defendant, section 50 is a penal 
section which classifies infringement of the right as a mis-
demeanor; section 51 provides a civil cause of action which 
allows both injunctive relief and monetary compensation.68  
Elements of the action consist of use of a living person’s 
“name, portrait, picture or voice”69 for “advertising pur-
poses, or for the purposes of trade”70 and failure to obtain 
that person’s written consent for such use.71 
b. Commercial Use 
In New York, sections 50 and 51 disallow unconsented 
use of a person’s name or likeness for the specific act of “ad-
vertising” and, more generally, for “purposes of trade.”72  
The New York Court of Appeals has noted that relief is lib-
erally granted when misappropriation occurs for advertising 
purposes.73  Claims of use for other commercial purposes, 
                                                                                                                                  
York, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 17, 1992, at 5.  To date, however, no such legislation has been 
passed. 
68. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51. 
69. Id. § 51.  Section 50, however, includes only “name, portrait or picture,” 
thereby excluding misappropriation of “voice” from criminal penalty.  Id. § 50. 
Because no common law right of publicity exists in New York, protection is 
limited by section 51 to appropriation of only “name, portrait, picture or voice”.  
See Gibson & Healy, supra note 45, at 385.  Some courts applying New York law, 
however, have expanded the meaning of these terms.  See, e.g., Allen v. National 
Home Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).  In Allen, where defendant 
used a “look-alike” of Woody Allen in an advertisement, the court held that a 
commercial use “which has no other purpose than to represent its subject, must 
give rise to a cause of action under the Civil Rights Law, because it raises the ob-
vious implication that its subject has endorsed or is otherwise involved with the 
product being advertised.”  Id. at 622; accord Onassis v. Christian Dior N.Y., Inc., 
472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct. 1983) (involving an advertisement using a look-alike 
of Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis). 
In appropriation cases where an advertiser falsely implies celebrity en-
dorsement, relief may also be available under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 
Trademark Act of 1946 (“Lanham Act”), ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a) (West Supp. 1996)), the federal trademark and 
unfair competition law, where the standard is not “identifiability,” but “likeli-
hood of confusion.”  See, e.g., Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 625-31. 
70. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. See Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 299 N.Y.S.2d 501, 505 (Sup. Ct. 
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such as merchandising, are no less actionable.74 
While the New York legislature did not define “advertis-
ing” or “purposes of trade” in the statutes,75 courts applying 
New York law have carved out what types of uses are not 
considered actionable.  Such “fair uses”76 include, generally, 
reporting of news and public interest stories,77 and the me-
dia’s promotion of itself.78  Fair use in news reporting, how-
ever, includes not only “headline” and political news, but 
also extends to the commentary on social trends and articles 
of public and consumer interest.79  Specific cases of fair use 
in New York have included fashion news in New York maga-
zine indicating where a pictured article of clothing could be 
purchased;80 the performance of stage plays and films; 81 and 
the public distribution of calendars82 and posters.83 
                                                                                                                                  
1968); see also Stephano, 474 N.E.2d at 584. 
74. See, e.g., Shamsky v. Garan, Inc., 632 N.Y.S.2d 930 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (com-
mercial use on baseball jerseys); Titan Sports, Inc. v. Comics World Corp., 870 
F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1989) (commercial use on posters). 
75. See Stephano, 474 N.E.2d at 584 (noting that “[t]he statute does not define 
trade or advertising purposes”). 
76. “Fair use,” a term borrowed from copyright law, Copyright Act of 1976, 
17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West Supp. 1996), is equally applicable to right of publicity 
jurisprudence.  See, e.g., H. Lee Hetherington, Direct Commercial Exploitation of 
Identity:  A New Age for the Right of Publicity, 17 COLUM.-VLA J.L & ARTS 1, 28-30 
(1992). 
77. See infra part I.C.1. 
78. See infra part I.C.2. 
79. Stephano, 474 N.E.2d at 585. 
80. Id. at 581-82. 
81. Hampton v. Guare, 600 N.Y.S.2d 57, 58 (App. Div. 1993). In Hampton, an 
action which involved the play and film Six Degrees of Separation, both of which 
were based on the story of an actual person, the court held that “works of fiction 
and satire do not fall within the narrow scope of the statutory phrases ‘advertis-
ing’ and ‘trade.’”  Id. 
82. Beverley v. Choices Women’s Medical Ctr., Inc., 532 N.Y.S.2d 400, 402 
(App. Div. 1988) (involving the unauthorized use of a physician’s photograph on 
a medical center calendar). 
83. Brinkley v. Casablancas, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1006 (App. Div. 1981) (in-
volving the retail sale of an unauthorized poster of model Christie Brinkley). 
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2. California 
a. Statutory and Common Law 
Unlike New York, California recognizes both a common 
law and a statutory right of publicity.84  The statute was en-
acted in 1971 as California Civil Code section 3344 (“section 
3344”),85 and the common law right was acknowledged in 
1979 by a California appellate court.86 
To plead an infringement of the common law right, a 
plaintiff must allege:  the defendant’s appropriation of the 
plaintiff’s name or likeness for the defendant’s commercial 
or other advantage; lack of consent; and resulting injury.87  
Section 3344 requires the additional showing of “knowing 
use . . . for purposes of advertising or solicitation of pur-
chases.”88  The statute, however, provides that statutory 
remedies are cumulative and additional to any others pro-
vided by common law.89 
In California, as in New York,90 an action for misappro-
priation of a person’s name or likeness generally involves 
some type of commercial use.91  Section 3344 protects against 
 
84. See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988); 
Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 346 (Ct. App. 1983); CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 3344 (adopted 1971); CAL. CIV. CODE § 990 (West 1990) (protecting a post-
mortem right of publicity for 50 years) (adopted 1984). 
85. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1996); see also Robert B. Miller, Commercial 
Appropriation of an Individual’s Name, Photograph or Likeness:  A New Remedy for 
Californians, 3 PAC. L.J. 651 (1972) (tracing California privacy and publicity rights 
law and culminating with the enactment of section 3344). 
86. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 428 (Cal. 1979).  The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, had recognized a Cali-
fornia common law right of publicity in 1974.  Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 825 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that “California appellate 
courts would, in a case such as this one, afford legal protection to an individual’s 
proprietary interest in his own identity”). 
87. Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 347. 
88. Id. 
89. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(g). 
90. See supra part I.B.1.a. 
91. But see Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 347 (“A common law cause of action 
for appropriation . . . may be pleaded by alleging . . . appropriation . . . to defen-
dant’s advantage, commercially or otherwise.”) (emphasis added). 
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misappropriation of “name, voice, signature, photograph, or 
likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or 
goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting 
purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or services 
. . . .”92  California common law, however, does not require 
that the use of a person’s name or likeness imply an en-
dorsement or any association with the allegedly injured per-
son.93  The lack of such a requirement results in California 
common law offering broader protection than section 3344. 
b. Broadening of California Common Law 
Because California common law is not limited to the 
statutory appropriations of “name, voice, photograph, or 
likeness,”94 the California common law right of publicity is 
also broader than section 3344 with regard to the aspects of a 
person which it protects.95  For example, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit extended the right in 
1974 and allowed recovery where cigarette advertisers pic-
tured a race car clearly recognizable as that of the plaintiff, a 
widely-known professional racer.96  The court held that the 
use of the plaintiff’s distinctive car was sufficient to evoke 
the identity of the celebrity driver.97 
The Ninth Circuit again broadened California common 
law in 1992 in a case involving game show hostess, Vanna 
White.98  There, an advertiser had pictured a robot dressed 
in a blond wig, a gown, and jewelry, and posed next to the 
famous Wheel of Fortune game board.99  The circuit court, 
reversing a summary judgment against White, found that, 
 
92. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a). 
93. Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 347. 
94. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir. 1992). 
95. See Stephen M. Lobbin, The Right(s) of Publicity in California:  Is Three 
Really Greater than One?, 2 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 157, 168 (1995). 
96. Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 
1974). 
97. Id. at 827. 
98. White, 971 F.2d at 1397-99. 
99. Id. at 1396. 
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under California common law, “[i]t is not important how the 
defendant has appropriated the plaintiff’s identity, but 
whether the defendant has done so.”100  The Ninth Circuit’s 
holding that it is only important whether a defendant has ap-
propriated some aspect of a plaintiff’s personality, coupled 
with the fact that the common law infringement does not re-
quire “knowing use,”101 has caused some commentators to 
infer that the California common law right of publicity is a 
tort of strict liability.102 
C. First Amendment Conflicts with the Right of Publicity 
Despite the relief provided by various common law and 
statutory rights of publicity, no person can control every use 
of his or her name or picture.103  In some circumstances, both 
publicity and privacy rights must yield to the First Amend-
ment freedoms of speech and press and corresponding state 
freedoms.104  Due to those freedoms, a large portion of the 
 
100. Id. at 1398.  Additional cases in which plaintiffs have succeeded in Cali-
fornia common law actions where their identity was merely evoked include 
“sound-alike” cases.  See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 
1992) (imitation of singer Tom Waits’ voice); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 
460 (9th Cir. 1988) (imitation of singer Bette Midler’s voice). 
101. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (indicating that only CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 3344 requires “knowing” use). 
102. See Barbara M. Lange, Shopping for the California Right of Publicity, 16 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 151, 165 (1993) (“California common law, unlike sec-
tion 3344, imposes strict liability on a defendant.”); cf. Miller, supra note 85, at 659 
(noting that in privacy actions “courts applied what amounted to strict liability 
while the new statute [section 3344] appears to require proof of an intentional 
invasion of privacy”); see also generally Linda J. Stack, White v. Samsung Electron-
ics America, Inc.’s Expansion of the Right of Publicity:  Enriching Celebrities at the 
Expense of Free Speech, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1189 (1995); Christopher Pesce, The Like-
ness Monster:  Should the Right of Publicity Protect Against Imitation?, 65 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 782 (1990). 
103. See supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text (discussing “fair use”). 
104. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”). 
Some state courts have construed state freedoms of speech and press to pro-
vide greater protection than the First Amendment.  See, e.g., New Kids on the 
Block v. News Am. Publishing, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 1540, 1545 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 1990) 
(“[T]he California Supreme Court has interpreted the California Constitution as 
providing greater protection to speech than does the First Amendment.”); People 
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right of publicity body of law addresses its interplay with 
the First Amendment.105  In Eastwood v. Superior Court, the 
Supreme Court of California weighed both privacy and pub-
licity interests against the First Amendment, and cautioned 
that “a proper accommodation between these competing 
concerns must be defined, since ‘the rights guaranteed by 
the First Amendment do not require total abrogation of the 
right to privacy.’”106 
In California, an exception exists within section 3344 it-
self for “news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or account, 
or any political campaign.”107  In New York, however, nei-
ther section 50 nor 51 creates an express privilege for such 
use; exceptions in New York have developed through court 
                                                                                                                                  
v. Schrader, 617 N.Y.S.2d 429, 435 (Crim. Ct. 1994) (“The language of [the New 
York Constitution’s provision for free speech and free press] is not only unique 
from that of the First Amendment but is also an express grant of the right to 
speak freely. . . . By comparison, the First Amendment is only a restraint on the 
government’s power to make no laws ‘abridging the freedom of speech . . . .’”). 
The United States Supreme Court has also recognized that states may pro-
vide greater freedoms of speech and press than the First Amendment.  In Zac-
chini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., the Court, in its only case recognizing 
publicity rights, held, where the media broadcasted a performer’s entire act on 
television, that “although the [state] may as a matter of its own law privilege the 
press . . ., the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not require it to do so.”  433 
U.S. 562, 578-79 (1977). 
While this Note refers to the First Amendment freedoms of speech and 
press, its arguments hold for corresponding state freedoms.  This Note also does 
not differentiate between the First Amendment used as an exception, as an im-
munity or privilege, or as a defense.  Professor J. Thomas McCarthy, the leading 
scholar on the law of publicity rights, and author of the sole treatise on the sub-
ject, suggests that the distinction is not significant in this area of law.  See 
MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 8.6[E], at 8-38.2 to .3.  The distinction, however, may 
be significant in determining on which party a burden of proof rests.  Id. 
105. See Gibson & Healey, supra note 45, at 379 (discussing the First 
Amendment as a “frequently litigated affirmative defense” in right of publicity 
cases). 
106. Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 350 (Ct. App. 1983) 
(quoting Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 483 P.2d 34, 42 (Cal. 1971)). 
107. The statute provides that “[f]or purposes of this section a use of name, 
voice, signature, photograph, or likeness in connection with any news, public 
affairs, or sports broadcast or account, or any political campaign, shall not consti-
tute a use for which consent is required under subdivision (a).”  CAL. CIV. CODE § 
3344(d). 
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decisions.108 
1. Media Reporting and Newsworthiness 
First Amendment exceptions to the right of publicity 
greatly benefit the media.109  A New York court has ob-
served that “it has consistently been emphasized that [sec-
tions 50 and 51 were] not intended to limit activities involv-
ing the dissemination of news or information concerning 
matters of public interest and that such activities are privi-
leged and do not fall within ‘the purposes of trade’ contem-
plated by Section 51 . . . .”110 
In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,111 the 
United States Supreme Court addressed the effect which the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments had on a state right of 
publicity.  Although the Court held that the Constitution did 
not allow the media to broadcast a “human cannonball’s” 
entire act on television, the Justices did note that the per-
former’s right of publicity could not prevent the media from 
reporting newsworthy facts about the act.112  The Court then 
held that “[w]herever the line in particular situations is to be 
drawn between media reports that are protected and those 
that are not, we are quite sure that the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments do not immunize the media when they broad-
cast a performer’s entire act without his consent.”113  Clearly, 
 
108. See Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 260 N.Y.S.2d 451, 455 (App. Div. 
1965).  According to the Spahn court:  “Notably, the statute makes no provision 
for any privileged uses or exemptions.  Whatever privileges or exemptions have 
been developed in the decisional law rest on strong policy considerations and, 
perhaps to some extent, on constitutional guarantees of free speech and of the 
press.”  Id. 
109. See Randy S. Frisch, New Technologies on the Block:  New Kids on the 
Block v. News America Publishing, Inc., 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 51, 58 
(1991) (“The concern over the media’s freedom to disseminate news without un-
due restriction is often held to outweigh the right of publicity.”). 
110. Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 299 N.Y.S.2d 501, 506 (Sup. Ct. 
1968). 
111. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).  Zacchini is the sole United States Supreme Court 
case to address the right of publicity. 
112. Id. at 573. 
113. Id.  The Court noted also that given important differences between mis-
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therefore, First Amendment protection exists for the media 
to publish newsworthy items despite state law rights of pub-
licity.114  It appears, however, that unless a performer’s “en-
tire act” is appropriated by broadcast media, the extent of 
the privilege must be determined on a case by case basis.115 
Both New York and California courts have long recog-
nized “newsworthy” and “public interest” exceptions to the 
exercise of publicity rights.116  California courts, in fact, have 
cited New York law in noting that “it was early held that 
newspapers, magazines, and newsreels are exempt from the 
statutory injunction when using a name or picture in connec-
tion with an item of news or one that is newsworthy . . . .”117  
The two states have also extended the privilege to books, 
comic books, radio, television, motion pictures, handbills, 
and posters.118  Even Samuel Warren and Justice Brandeis, 
the first proponents of the right of privacy, acknowledged 
that use of a name or photo in connection with an item of 
news is permissible.119 
Although advocates of the rights of publicity and pri-
vacy, such as Warren and Brandeis, recognize a “news” ex-
                                                                                                                                  
appropriation of the right of publicity and other tort actions, holdings in right of 
privacy cases, such as Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), and defamation cases, 
such as New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), are not applicable in 
adjudicating right of publicity appropriation actions.  Id. at 570-71. 
114. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573. 
115. See Bridgette Marie De Gyarfas, Right of Publicity v. Fiction Based Art:  
Which Deserves More Protection?, 15 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 381, 386 (1995) (“[I]t is un-
clear whether the [Zacchini] holding provides any guidance to right of publicity 
cases where the defendant uses less than the performer’s entire act.”). 
116. See, e.g., Montana, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 641; Stephano, 474 N.E.2d at 584-85 
(The terms “advertising” and “purposes of trade” “should not be construed to 
apply to publications concerning newsworthy events or matters of public inter-
est.”). 
117. See, e.g., Montana, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 641 (quoting Paulsen, 299 N.Y.S.2d 
at 506). 
118. See id.; Paulsen, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 506 (listing privileged communications 
media, including newspapers, magazines, newsreels, books, comic books, radio, 
television, motion pictures, posters, and handbills). 
119. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 33, at 214 (“The right to privacy does not 
prohibit any publication of matter which is of public or general interest.”). 
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ception, the courts have been responsible for broadening the 
definition of the term “newsworthy.”120  The New York 
Court of Appeals, for example, in holding that fashion may 
be newsworthy, wrote that the “content” of an article deter-
mines whether that article is newsworthy.121  California 
courts, in examining the content, have considered whether 
the news or public interest item has “caught the popular 
imagination”122 and have noted that “[p]ublic interest at-
taches to people who by their accomplishments or mode of 
living create a bona fide attention to their activities.”123  Both 
New York and California have also held that items of public 
interest need not be restricted to current events, but may ex-
tend to the reprinting of articles and photos concerning past 
events.124 
Professor J. Thomas McCarthy, in The Rights of Publicity 
and Privacy, argues that an appropriate test for misappro-
priation would consider not the newsworthiness or interest 
of a person, but the “place and context” of the use of that 
person’s name or likeness.125  McCarthy argues that on 
products like coffee mugs, a First Amendment defense 
“rings somewhat hollow” and that “if all it took for a defen-
dant to wrap itself in the first amendment was to add an ap-
propriate ‘Express Your Support for ________’ slogan on all 
celebrity merchandise, then the right of a celebrity to control 
the commercial property value in his or her identity would 
 
120. See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 8.8[B], at 8-44 to -52, -47 (“Illus-
trative List of Items Held Newsworthy”). 
121. Stephano, 474 N.E.2d at 585. 
122. Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 792 (Ct. App. 1993) 
(citing Smith v. National Broadcasting Co., 292 P.2d 600 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956)). 
123. Id. (quoting Carlisle v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 20 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Ct. 
App. 1962)). 
124. Montana, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 640; see also Shamsky v. Garan, Inc., 632 
N.Y.S.2d 930 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (finding right of publicity for 1969 Mets baseball 
team). 
125. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 7.6[A], at 
7-25 (1987 & Supp. 1996). 
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be destroyed.”126 
Past California cases demonstrate agreement with 
McCarthy.  For example, in Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg 
Productions,127 the California Supreme Court held that the 
name and likeness of Rudolph Valentino in a television “fac-
tionalization” was allowed by the First Amendment; on the 
same day however, in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures,128 the court 
found that the likeness of Bela Lugosi as Count Dracula was 
not permissible on items such as plastic toy pencil sharpen-
ers, plastic model figures, T-shirts and sweat shirts, soap and 
detergent products, picture puzzles, candy dispensers, 
masks, kites, belts and belt buckles, and beverage stirring 
rods.129  Thus, the California court distinguished use on mer-
chandise from use for literary or entertainment purposes.130  
Moreover, in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.,131 a com-
mercial speech132 case involving unsolicited mailings, the 
United States Supreme Court held that “advertising which 
‘links a product to a current public debate’ is not thereby en-
titled to the constitutional protection afforded noncommer-
 
126. Id.  McCarthy’s suggestion that merchandisers label their products with 
“Express Your Support for ________” connotates that the speech would then 
qualify as political speech, thereby requiring strict scrutiny by courts.  See, e.g., 
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (“[A] facially content-based restric-
tion on political speech in a public forum . . . must be subjected to exacting scru-
tiny . . . .”); see generally MCCARTHY, supra note 125, § 8.2[A], at 8-12 to -16 (“The 
Hierarchy of First Amendment Protection”) (distinguishing the levels of constitu-
tional protection, from highest to lowest, given to political speech and news, fic-
tion and entertainment, and commercial speech respectively). 
127. 603 P.2d 454 (Cal. 1979). 
128. 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979). 
129. Id. at 435. 
130. See Guglielmi, 603 P.2d at 463-64 (Bird, C.J., concurring). 
131. 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (holding unconstitutional a federal statute which 
prohibited unsolicited mailing of contraceptive advertisements where a pro-
posed mailing discussed venereal disease and family planning and provided 
contraceptive product information). 
132. Commercial speech is speech which does “no more than propose a 
commercial transaction.”  Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human 
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973).  It is the least protected form of expression.  
See supra note 126. 
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cial speech.”133  Following Bolger, an entire item may be cate-
gorized as commercial speech, and thereby given a lower 
level of constitutional protection, despite its containing 
speech of public interest.134 
2. Media promotion 
A corollary to the freedoms of speech and press is the 
right of the media to reproduce previously published stories 
or photographs as advertisements for promotional pur-
poses.135  These advertisements may appear in the original 
publisher’s own media, in other media, or in “poster, circu-
lar, cover or soliciting letter.”136  Both New York and Cali-
fornia have acknowledged that such a right is well-
established and incidental to the purpose of news reporting 
itself.137 
In Booth v. Curtis Publishing Co., a New York appellate 
court recognized a right of the media to promote itself, and 
noted that policy reasons allow such use because publica-
tions can best demonstrate their quality and content through 
copies or extractions from past editions.138  The New York 
court also relied on the historical argument that the long-
 
133. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 68 (quoting Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. 
Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 n.5 (1980)).  But see Riley v. National 
Fed’n of the Blind of North Carolina, 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988) (explaining that 
where “the component parts of a single speech are inextricably intertwined, we 
cannot parcel out speech, applying one test to one phrase and another test to an-
other phrase. . . . Therefore, we apply our test for fully protected expression.”) 
(emphasis added). 
134. See Frisch, supra note 109, at 57-58 (discussing a “primary nature of the 
use” test). 
135. See Montana, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 642-43; Namath v. Sports Illustrated, 
371 N.Y.S.2d 10, 11-12 (App. Div. 1975). 
136. Booth v. Curtis Publishing Co., 223 N.Y.S.2d 737, 743 (App. Div. 1962). 
137. See Montana, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 642; Namath, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 11.  Ac-
cording to the New York courts, in Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 178 
N.Y.S. 752 (App. Div. 1919), the “principle was laid down that the news dissemi-
nator was entitled to display extracts for purposes of attracting users and selling 
its product. . . . The advertising, which [the poster] was unquestionably, was 
held to be incidental to the exhibition of the [newsreel] itself.”  Booth, 223 
N.Y.S.2d at 741. 
138. Booth, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 743 and n.4. 
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standing practice of reproducing extracts from covers and 
pages of out-of-issue periodicals “is ample recognition that 
the usage has not violated the sensibilities of the community 
or the purport of the [right of publicity] statute.”139 
In considering the media’s right to promote itself, courts 
have also held that a “profit motive by the media . . . is ir-
relevant to the inquiry of whether the content of [its] speech 
is political or commercial.”140  Therefore, the fact that the 
media advertises and operates for a profit does not revoke 
its First Amendment protection.141  Courts have distin-
guished, however, cases where a non-media business has 
reprinted a newsworthy story in order to advertise a product 
of its own.142  Such were the facts where a safe manufacturer 
incorporated into an advertisement a full article from a local 
newspaper about business records needlessly lost in a fire.143  
There, the reprinted article was not protected as news.144 
The First Amendment, therefore, protects much of what 
the media publish when their subjects may be considered 
newsworthy or of public interest.145  Appropriations of 
name, likeness, or other aspects of a person, may neverthe-
less be actionable when they are used in non-media advertis-
 
139. Id. at 743. 
140. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publishing, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 
1540, 1544 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (quoting Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 38 F.2d 380, 384 
n.4 (9th Cir. 1988)); see also generally MCCARTHY, supra note 125, § 8.8[F][1]-[2], at 
8-62 to -67 (“Media Profit and Advertising Do Not Remove First Amendment 
Protection”).  In the context of a defamation case, the United States Supreme 
Court has written that “[i]f a profit motive could somehow strip communications 
of the otherwise available constitutional protection, our cases from New York 
Times to Hustler Magazine would be little more than empty vessels.”  Harte-
Hanks Communications v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 667 (1989). 
141. See Montana, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 643 n.2. 
142. See, e.g., Flores v. Mosler Safe Co., 164 N.E.2d 853 (N.Y. 1959). 
143. Flores, 164 N.E.2d at 854. 
144. Id. at 857; accord Reilly v. Rapperswill Corp., 377 N.Y.S.2d 488 (App. 
Div. 1975) (involving the reproduction of a television broadcast concerning the 
energy crisis in a promotional film to advertise insulation). 
145. See supra part I.C.1 (discussing First Amendment protection of media 
reporting and newsworthy items). 
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ing, merchandising, or for other “purposes of trade.”146  
Largely unexamined, however, is an overlapping area where 
the media merchandise products to promote its publications. 
II. MONTANA AND TITAN SPORTS:  CASES INVOLVING MEDIA 
MERCHANDISING 
Three reported cases have involved the media acting as 
merchandiser.  In Mendonsa v. Time, Inc.,147 the court denied 
the defendant’s motion for dismissal for failure to state a 
claim based on a Rhode Island right to privacy statute.148  
There, the court held that whether the sale of limited-edition 
photographs constituted use of plaintiff’s likeness for “pur-
poses of trade” was “a matter that [had] to be decided after a 
full development of the facts.”149  However, the court did not 
indicate how it would make that determination.150  The re-
maining cases, Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc.151 and 
Titan Sports, Inc. v. Comics World Corp.,152 both ended litiga-
tion after appeals from granted motions for summary judg-
ment.153  This part presents the facts, procedural history, and 
decisions of the Montana and Titan Sports cases. 
A. Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc. 
“Joe” Montana played professional football as quarter-
back for the San Francisco Forty-niners (“49ers”) from 1979 
to 1992.154  After playing two additional seasons for the Kan-
sas City Chiefs, Montana announced his retirement in San 
 
146. See supra part I.B.1.b (discussing the right of publicity protection 
against “commercial” use). 
147. 678 F. Supp. 967 (D.R.I. 1988). 
148. Id. at 972. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639 (Ct. App. 1995), as modified, (May 30, 1995), review 
denied, (Aug. 17, 1995). 
152. 870 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1989), rev’g 690 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
153. Montana, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 640; Titan Sports, 870 F.2d at 86. 
154. A Look at Joe’s Career, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 18, 1995, at E2; see also generally 
JOE MONTANA WITH DICK SCHAPP, MONTANA (1995). 
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Francisco on April 18, 1995.155  On that day, San Franciscans 
hailed Montana as “the greatest football player of all time”156 
and someone whose “arrival [in San Francisco] and revival 
of the 49ers flagging fortunes helped unite, inspire and re-
kindle the spirit of our region.”157 
During his sixteen seasons in the National Football 
League (“NFL”), Montana won more than seventy percent of 
the games he started, and thirty-one times led his team to 
victory after trailing in the fourth quarter.158  He is ranked as 
an NFL leader in career passing touchdowns, completions, 
attempts, and yards,159 and is a three-time Super Bowl Most 
Valuable Player.160  During Montana’s fourteen seasons in 
San Francisco, the 49ers competed in and won four Super 
Bowl championships:  in 1982, 1985, 1989, and 1990.161 
On Monday, January 23, 1989, the day following the 
49ers’ victory in Super Bowl XXIII, news of the team’s 
championship appeared on the front page of a special sec-
tion of the San Jose Mercury News.162  Accompanying the 
story was a color photograph of Montana celebrating the 
win with three teammates.163  The following year, the 49ers’ 
victory in Super Bowl XXIV also earned the team a special 
section of the Mercury News on Monday, January 29, 1990.164  
Again, a color photograph accompanying the story pictured 
Joe Montana “flying high in celebration” with a teammate.165 
 
155. Edward Epstein, 50,000 See Montana Pass Into Retirement/49ers Brass, Ex-
Teammates Salute Legend, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 19, 1995, at A1. 
156. Id. (quoting former Forty-niners coach, Bill Walsh). 
157. The Montana Era Passes, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 19, 1995, at A18. 
158. MONTANA WITH SCHAPP, supra note 154, at 5. 
159. Id. at 141. 
160. A Look at Joe’s Career, supra note 154, at E2. 
161. Id. 
162. 49ers’ Fantastic Finish:  Montana’s Magic Gives S.F. Third Title of 80’s with 
34 Seconds to Spare, They Win Super Bowl XXIII 20-16, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 
Jan. 23, 1989, at 1SB. 
163. Id. 
164. The Big Easy:  49ers Breeze Past Broncos 55-10 for Fourth Title, SAN JOSE 
MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 29, 1990, at 1SB. 
165. Id. 
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Two weeks following the fourth 49ers’ Super Bowl vic-
tory of the years between 1980 and 1990, the Mercury News 
published a special “Souvenir Section” which the newspaper 
inserted into its regular Sunday edition on February 4, 
1990.166  The souvenir section, entitled “1980-1990:  The Tro-
phy Hunters,” was devoted entirely to the 49ers, and in-
cluded original stories by staff reporters, personal accounts 
by various 49ers players, season records, previously pub-
lished photographs of the team and of individual players, 
and, on the section’s cover, an artist’s drawing of quarter-
back Joe Montana.167 
Within weeks of the original publishings, the Mercury 
News reproduced in poster form 1,000 copies each of the 
front pages of the January 23, 1989, and January 29, 1990, 
special sections, and the front page of the February 4, 1990, 
souvenir section.168  Approximately 900 copies of these post-
ers were sold for five dollars each, and the remaining posters 
were distributed free of charge, primarily at charity 
events.169 
In 1992, two years after the Mercury News printed the last 
of its posters, Joe Montana filed suit in California Superior 
 
166. 1980-1990:  The Trophy Hunters, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Feb. 4, 1990, at 
1G. 
167. Id.  Forty-niners players who wrote their recollections for the special 
edition include Jack “Hacksaw” Reynolds, Bill Ring, Ronnie Lott, and Brent 
Jones.  Id. 
For a discussion of the First Amendment implications of fine art, such as the art-
ist’s rendition of Montana, see generally Amiel B. Weisfogel, Fine Art’s Uncertain 
Protection:  The New York Right of Privacy Statute and the First Amendment, 20 
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 91 (1995). 
168. Montana, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 640; NFL Notes, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 18, 1995, 
at D2. 
169. Montana, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 640.  The Executive Editor of the Mercury 
News said at the time of the suit, and printed in the Mercury News itself, “You 
don’t make money [by selling the posters] at $5.  We normally price these things 
to cover our costs.  We make a little on one and lose a little on another.”  Brandon 
Bailey, Joe Montana Sues MN Over Super Bowl Posters, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 
Jan. 9, 1992, at 4B.  Following the litigation, an attorney for the Mercury News 
stated, “The Mercury News regularly does posters of pages of the newspaper as a 
form of promotion.”  Court Sacks Montana, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 18, 1995, at 5. 
    
806 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [7:779 
Court, Santa Clara County, against the San Jose newspaper 
for common law and statutory misappropriation of his 
name, photograph, and likeness.170  The suit requested an in-
junction against further sale or distribution of the posters, a 
court order requiring that the newspaper account for profits 
from the sale of the posters, and that those profits be in-
cluded in damages paid to Montana.171  In a motion for 
summary judgment, the Mercury News argued that the First 
Amendment protected its publication of the posters because 
the posters depicted newsworthy events.172 
Diverting focus from the issue of newsworthiness, the 
plaintiff conceded that he was, in fact, newsworthy.173  He 
only agreed, however, that his newsworthiness gave the 
Mercury News the right to print the original photographs and 
news accounts in 1989 and 1990.174  Montana also did not 
dispute the fact that the Mercury News’ posters advertised 
the quality and content of its newspaper.175  His complaint 
still questioned, however, the right of the newspaper to re-
produce pages of newsworthy items as posters.176  Neverthe-
less, the trial court granted the Mercury News’ motion for 
summary judgment on grounds that the First Amendment 
barred Montana from suing the newspaper for appropriation 
of his name and likeness.177 
At the Court of Appeal for the Sixth District, a three 
 
170. Montana, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 640.  A number of journalists criticized 
Montana for bringing the action against the newspaper.  See, e.g., Lew Freedman, 
Montana, Barkley Demean Themselves With Petty Lawsuits, ANCHORAGE DAILY 
NEWS, Aug. 30, 1995, at 1C; Gerald Z. Marer, Joe Montana, Litigation All-Pro, TEX. 
LAW., June 5, 1995, at 8.  But cf. MCCARTHY, supra note 67, at 139-41 (“Responding 
to the Critics of the Right of Publicity”). 
171. Bailey, supra note 169, at 4B. 
172. Montana, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 640.  The Mercury News also argued that 
Montana’s suit was barred by the applicable state statute of limitations, an issue 
which the trial court did not reach.  Id. 
173. Id. at 641. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 643. 
176. Montana, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 641. 
177. Id. at 640. 
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judge panel unanimously affirmed the granting of the mo-
tion, writing that “Montana’s name and likeness appeared in 
the posters for precisely the same reason they appeared on 
the original newspaper front pages:  because Montana was a 
major player in contemporaneous sports events.”178  The ap-
pellate court then held that the Mercury News had the right 
to reprint and sell the poster-size prints because the posters 
“reported on newsworthy events”179 and because a “news-
paper has a constitutional right to promote itself by repro-
ducing its news stories.”180  Montana’s petition for review by 
the California Supreme Court was summarily denied with 
one justice in dissent.181 
The California Court of Appeal analogized the case to a 
number of cases among which were several decisions made 
under New York law and a California case which had con-
sidered the newsworthiness of a video documentary.182  
However, the court admitted that it was “unable to locate 
any cases directly on point.”183  On the issue of newsworthi-
ness, the principal case which the court relied on is Paulsen v. 
Personality Posters, Inc.,184 in which a New York trial court 
held that a poster depicting a comedian and the words “FOR 
PRESIDENT” received First Amendment protection when 
the comedian had made a public, albeit mock, entry into the 
1968 presidential campaign.185  Additionally the Montana 
appellate court cited Jackson v. MPI Home Video,186 which 
concerned distribution of a videotaped speech by political 
leader Jesse Jackson, and Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc.,187 
which involved a video documentary of a private individual 
 
178. Id. at 641. 
179. Id. at 640. 
180. Id. at 642. 
181. See 1995 Cal. LEXIS 509 (Aug. 17, 1995). 
182. Montana, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 641-43. 
183. Id. at 641. 
184. 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1968). 
185. Id. at 503-09. 
186. 694 F. Supp. 483 (N.D. Ill. 1988). 
187. 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790 (Ct. App. 1993). 
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held to be both newsworthy and of public interest as a surf-
ing “legend of Malibu.”188  In Dora, however, the plaintiff 
had questioned his own newsworthiness.189 
In a footnote, the Montana appellate court took notice of 
Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.190  There, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, applying New York 
law, held that although Elvis Presley’s death was a news-
worthy event, a poster of Presley including the words “IN 
MEMORY 1935-1977” did not merit First Amendment pro-
tection.191  The Factors court distinguished Paulsen and held 
that “[w]e cannot accept [the] contention that the legend in 
‘IN MEMORY . . .’ placed its poster in the same category as 
one picturing a presidential candidate.”192 
The California Court of Appeal also cited to a number of 
cases in its holding that the San Jose Mercury News has a right 
to promote itself by reproducing newsworthy stories and 
photographs as advertisements.193  Cher v. Forum Interna-
tional, Ltd.194 involved a tabloid magazine’s front cover “ad-
vertisements” of the contents of the magazine, and further 
issues complicated by false light privacy.  Booth v. Curtis 
Publishing Co.195 and Namath v. Sports Illustrated196 both in-
volved defendant magazines reproduction of photographs 
which had previously been printed either with consent or as 
newsworthy material.  In both Booth and Namath, publishers 
had reprinted photographs within their own or other peri-
odicals as part of advertisements to promote subscriptions 
and sales.197 
 
188. Id. at 791. 
189. Id. at 793. 
190. Montana, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 641 n.1 (citing Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, 
Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978)). 
191. Factors, 579 F.2d at 222. 
192. Id. 
193. Montana, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 642-43. 
194. 692 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1982). 
195. 223 N.Y.S.2d 737 (App. Div. 1962). 
196. 371 N.Y.S.2d 10 (App. Div. 1975). 
197. Booth, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 740 (involving a photo of Shirley Booth originally 
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B. Titan Sports, Inc. v. Comics World Corp. 
In 1988, Titan Sports, Inc. (“Titan Sports”), corporate 
owner of both the World Wrestling Federation (“WWF”) 
trademark and the rights in the names and likenesses of 
many of the WWF’s professional wrestlers and managers, 
brought suit against Comics World Corp., Starlog Group, 
Inc., and O’Quinn Studios, Inc. for misappropriation of cer-
tain wrestlers’ names and photographs.198  At the time of the 
litigation, these figures included Hulk Hogan, Randy “Ma-
cho Man” Savage, and “Captain” Lou Albano.199  The defen-
dants published magazines which included “Wrestling 
Poster Magazine,” “Wrestling All Stars Super Giant Pin-
Ups,” and “Superstar Wrestlers Photo Album.”200 
The sole issue in Titan Sports was whether the defendants 
violated sections 50 and 51 of New York Civil Rights Law by 
including in their magazines “large, [approximately sixteen 
inches by twenty-two inches] photographic inserts variously 
known as ‘magazine posters,’ pin-ups, pullouts, centerfolds, 
or fold-outs, which are affixed by staples or otherwise to the 
inside of normal magazines, and often cannot be completely 
viewed without removing them entirely from the maga-
zine.”201  The “posters” depicted the wrestling stars and were 
published without either Titan Sports’ or the wrestlers’ con-
sent.202  All of the parties did agree that consent had been ob-
tained for the photographs themselves; they also agreed that 
the wrestlers were both public figures and newsworthy.203  
Titan Sports even conceded that the photographs would not 
                                                                                                                                  
printed in Holiday and reprinted in the New Yorker and Advertising Age); Namath, 
371 N.Y.S.2d at 13 (involving a photo of Joe Namath originally printed in Sports 
Illustrated and reprinted in Cosmopolitan and Life). 
198. Titan Sports, Inc. v. Comics World Corp., 690 F. Supp. 1315, 1316-17 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
199. Id. at 1317 n.3. 
200. Id. at 1317. 
201. Id. 
202. Id. 
203. Titan Sports, 690 F. Supp. at 1317. 
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violate section 51 “as long as the photos [did] not exceed the 
‘normal’ page size of defendant’s magazines, 8” x 11”.”204 
Prior to trial, both parties moved for summary judg-
ment.205  The trial court found that the posters were not in-
cluded for either advertising or trade purposes, because they 
were related to the publications’ subject matter.206  The court 
then granted the publishers’ motion, denied Titan Sports’ 
motion, and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.207 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.208  Noting 
that “it is appropriate for a court to consider ‘whether the 
public interest aspect of the publication is merely incidental 
to its commercial purpose,’” the court held that summary 
judgment was inappropriate.209  The court then proposed a 
test to be applied in the trial court to determine whether the 
defendant publishers inserted the posters for commercial 
purposes, that is a “purpose of trade.”210 
The Second Circuit’s Titan Sports test suggested that a 
fact-finder in the trial court consider variable factors, includ-
ing, but not limited to:  “the nature of the item, the extent of 
its relationship to the traditional content of a magazine, the 
ease with which it may be detached from the magazine, 
whether it is suitable for use as a separate product once de-
tached, and how the publisher markets the item.”211  The 
court then remanded the case to the district court.212 
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT SHOULD NOT PROTECT MEDIA 
 
204. Id. at 1318 (quoting the Stipulation of Facts for Purposes of the Motion). 
205. Id. at 1316. 
206. Id. at 1323. 
207. Id. 
208. Titan Sports, 870 F.2d at 86. 
209. Id. at 87-88 (quoting Davis v. High Soc’y Mag., Inc., 457 N.Y.S.2d 308, 
313 (App. Div. 1982)). 
210. Id. at 88-89.  The parties stipulated on appeal that the posters were not 
used for advertising purposes.  Id. at 87. 
211. Id. at 89. 
212. Titan Sports, 870 F.2d at 89.  Research reveals no subsequent history of 
litigation. 
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MERCHANDISING WHERE THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY IS 
INVOLVED 
When an item, such as a poster, may potentially be con-
sidered either protected media advertising or unprotected 
merchandising, courts must consider a number of issues and 
fully develop an understanding of the item involved.213  
Moreover, an understanding of the item requires a full de-
velopment of the facts, thereby making summary judgment 
inappropriate.214 
This part examines the right of publicity and First 
Amendment issues which arise when the media acts as mer-
chandiser.  It then analyzes the Montana decision, separating 
the courts “newsworthy” and “media promotion” discus-
sions, and argues that the California appellate court incor-
rectly affirmed summary judgment for the Mercury News.  
Finally, this part suggests that courts should apply the Sec-
ond Circuit’s Titan Sports test in cases where promotional 
items of the media may be considered merchandise.  It then 
applies the Titan Sports test to the facts of Montana. 
A. Right of Publicity Cases Involving Media Merchandising 
Require Full Development of Facts 
When an item may be viewed as either protected media 
advertising or unprotected merchandising, trial courts must 
decide not only how to determine whether that item more 
closely resembles advertising or merchandising, but also 
what that determination will mean to other decisions, such 
as summary judgment, burdens of proof, and the level of 
scrutiny to be used in applying First Amendment princi-
ples.215  In New York, courts should also consider whether 
 
213. See supra part I.B.1.b (discussing commercial use); part I.C.2 (discussing 
media advertising). 
214. See supra note 16 (explaining the standard for affirming summary 
judgment). 
215. See supra note 126 (describing the hierarchy of First Amendment protec-
tion). 
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“purposes of trade”216 requires proof of a defendant’s intent 
that an item be for “purposes of trade” or whether the com-
mercial purpose can be inherent in the item itself.217  In other 
words, courts should consider whether an item can be for 
“purposes of trade” if the merchandiser did not intend to 
profit from it.218 
The United States Supreme Court has indicated that 
where commercial speech is linked to issues of public inter-
est, the commercial speech is not awarded full constitutional 
protection.219  Courts have also indicated that a non-media 
advertiser may not reprint a newsworthy story to promote a 
product.220  In a case such as Montana, where the issue is not 
distinguishing commercial speech from noncommercial 
speech, but rather distinguishing constitutionally protected 
media advertising from unprotected merchandising, a court 
should still decide whether one use will “outweigh” the 
other.  That is, the court should decide whether the “adver-
tisement” aspects will be protected despite appearing on a 
merchandised product, or whether use on a commercial 
product will defeat the constitutional protection otherwise 
given to the media’s self-promoting advertisement.221  To 
correctly consider that issue, the disputed item’s advertising 
 
216. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51; see supra part I.B.1.b (discussing com-
mercial use). 
217. See supra part I.B.1.b (discussing commercial use). 
218. For example, if the facts surrounding Montana had occurred in New 
York, the proper inquiry would have been whether a “purpose of trade” might 
be shown by the fact that the Mercury News’ product competed with other li-
censed merchandised posters, regardless of whether the newspaper had in-
tended to profit from sale of the posters.  See supra part I.B.1.b (discussing com-
mercial use and fair use). 
California Civil Code section 3344, however, does not use the phrase “pur-
poses of trade,” but rather the more specific phrase “on or in products, merchan-
dise, or goods,” indicating that the use, not the “purpose” or intent of the user, is 
more important.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.  See supra part I.B.2 (discussing Califor-
nia law). 
219. See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text (discussing Bolger). 
220. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text (discussing Flores). 
221. See supra part I.B.1.b (discussing commercial use); part I.C.2 (discussing 
media advertising). 
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attributes and product merchandise attributes must be ex-
amined and weighed.  The necessity for such a “weighing” 
makes summary judgment inappropriate.222 
In California, courts have observed that the state’s su-
preme court has subjected the right of publicity to a “nar-
rowing interpretation which accords with First Amendment 
values.”223  Nevertheless, at least one legal writer has noted 
that the result in Montana was “not a foregone conclusion.”224  
While posters may advertise products, as in the cases of film 
posters or “wild” postings225 on city streets, other posters 
may be merchandised products with a commercial value and 
which buyers may frame and hang in their homes.226  More-
over, some posters may serve as both an advertisement and 
a product.  Because the nature of the poster must be deter-
mined, this analysis again reaches the conclusion that sum-
mary judgment is not an appropriate disposal of a case in-
volving such an item.227 
B. The Montana Court Erred in Applying Distinguishable 
 
222. See supra note 16 (discussing summary judgment). 
223. Cher v. Forum Int’l, Ltd., 692 F.2d 634, 638 (9th Cir. 1982); see also supra 
part I.C (reviewing First Amendment interplay with the right of publicity). 
224. See supra note 19. 
225. “Wild postings” are poster-size advertisements pasted “on walls and 
fences surrounding construction sites . . . .”  Surf Makes Washday More Colorful; 
Lever’s Detergent Pins Its New Ads to Offbeat Stories, ADVERTISING AGE, Feb. 19, 
1996, at 8. 
226. See supra notes 1-2, 4 (discussing the licensed merchandise industry).  
Some legal commentators have suggested that the buyer of a product which de-
picts the name or likeness of a personality is a First Amendment “speaker.”  See, 
e.g., Sims, supra note 29, at 494-95 (“The purchase and display of a poster or other 
form of celebrity memorabilia is a statement by the individual of esteem for—or 
in some cases, ridicule of—the celebrity subject.”).  However, McCarthy suggests 
that such an argument is moot because:  (1) in an infringement action, the mer-
chandiser, not the buyer, would be the defendant; (2) the buyer’s “speech” is 
more similar to “symbolic speech” than “pure speech” and would merit a lesser 
degree of scrutiny; and (3) the potential plaintiff’s interest is not in quieting the 
speech of the buyer, but rather in being compensated by the merchandiser.  
MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 7.6[B] at 7-27 to -29. 
227. See supra note 16 (explaining the standard for affirming summary 
judgment). 
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Case Law to the Particular Facts of Montana 
1. The “Newsworthy” Exception 
As noted above, Joe Montana stipulated his own news-
worthiness and public interest in recognition of the fact that 
the Mercury News had the right to print the original photo-
graphs and news accounts in 1989 and 1990.228  Finding 
Montana to be newsworthy, however, should not necessarily 
have caused his arguments to fail.  In right of publicity cases 
where a person’s name or likeness is appropriated for use in 
advertising or on merchandise, the injured person will most 
always be newsworthy or a celebrity of public interest.  If 
this were not so, the alleged infringer would have little want 
or use for the person’s name or likeness.229  Moreover, pre-
vious California case law indicates that a finding of news-
worthiness does not terminate the case.230  Such California 
decisions further imply that a poster, falling somewhere be-
tween the cases of clear product merchandising and pro-
tected media reporting or entertainment,231 requires full trial 
rather than summary judgment.232  Nevertheless, the court 
affirmed the summary judgment for the Mercury News.233 
In its opinion, the California Court of Appeal compared 
the case to a number of less-than-analogous cases, all of 
 
228. See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text (discussing Montana’s 
stipulation of newsworthiness). 
229. In right of privacy “appropriation” cases, however, a “private” person’s 
likeness is the subject of a complaint.  See, e.g., Roberson v. Rochester Folding 
Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902) (photo used on flour box); Rubino v. Slaughter, 
136 N.Y.S.2d 873 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (photo used on labor union poster); see also supra 
part I.A (reviewing the right of privacy). 
230. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text (discussing Guglielmi and 
Lugosi). 
231. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 
(1977) (“There is no doubt that entertainment, as well as news, enjoys First 
Amendment protection.”); see also supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text 
(discussing Zacchini). 
232. See supra note 16 (reviewing the standard for summary judgment). 
233. See supra note 178 and accompanying text (discussing the Montana ap-
pellate court’s ruling). 
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them distinguishable.234  The case upon which the court re-
lied principally, Paulsen, which involved a poster of a presi-
dential candidate, concerns political speech, a category of 
speech which requires stricter scrutiny than lesser-protected 
commercial speech.235  Another cited case, regarding video-
tape distribution of political commentary, again implicated 
political speech.236  Moreover, one of only a few California 
cases cited by the Montana court involved a video documen-
tary which the plaintiff agreed was a bona fide news me-
dia.237  There, however, the plaintiff unsuccessfully ques-
tioned his own newsworthiness.238  In Montana, the reverse is 
true; Montana conceded his own newsworthiness, but com-
plained of the products on which photographs of him were 
reprinted.239  None of the cited cases, as the court itself 
noted, is directly on point.240 
Finally, the court diminished Factors, a more closely 
analogous case, to a footnote.241  In Factors, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a poster of 
Elvis Presley did not merit First Amendment protection.242  
While California courts are under no obligation to follow the 
Second Circuit decision, the Montana court’s decision to dis-
regard Factors and follow Paulsen, while the Factors court dis-
tinguished Paulsen,243 indicates that California equates win-
ning the Super Bowl with political speech, and that Joe 
 
234. See supra notes 184-89 and accompanying text (discussing the Montana 
appellate court’s analysis of newsworthiness). 
235. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text (discussing Paulsen); su-
pra note 126 (describing the hierarchy of First Amendment protection). 
236. See supra note 186 and accompanying text (discussing Jackson). 
237. See supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text (discussing Dora). 
238. See supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text (discussing Dora). 
239. See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text (discussing Montana’s 
complaint). 
240. See supra note 183 and accompanying text (discussing the Montana ap-
pellate court’s analysis). 
241. See supra note 190 and accompanying text (discussing the Montana ap-
pellate court’s taking notice of Factors). 
242. See supra note 191 and accompanying text (discussing Factors). 
243. See supra note 192 and accompanying text (discussing Factors). 
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Montana is “bigger” than Elvis. 
2. The Media’s Right to Promote Itself 
The California Court of Appeal also cited to less than 
analogous cases in its holding that the San Jose Mercury News 
has a right to promote itself by reproducing its newsworthy 
stories and photographs as advertisements.244  Cher, where a 
tabloid magazine’s front cover “advertised” the contents of 
the magazine, is easily distinguishable.245  Clearly, magazine 
covers are not independent commercial products, therefore, 
Cher is not applicable to Montana.246 
Two other decisions upon which the Montana court re-
lied, Booth and Namath, are just as inapplicable.  In both 
cases, defendant magazines reprinted previously published 
photographs within their own or other periodicals as part of 
advertisements to promote subscriptions and sales.247  One 
can hardly argue, as is so with Montana’s posters, that the 
magazine pages or subscription cards were merchandised 
products independent of their use as advertising.248  Cer-
tainly, no one would expect a magazine reader to frame a 
subscription card or hang it on a wall as a poster. 
As with newsworthiness, Montana had not disputed the 
fact that one function of the Mercury News’ posters could 
have been to advertise the quality and content of its news-
paper.249  However, neither the concession of newsworthi-
ness nor of the possible promotional value of the posters 
 
244. See supra notes 193-97 and accompanying text (discussing the Montana 
appellate court’s analysis of the media’s right to promote itself). 
245. See supra note 194 and accompanying text (discussing Cher). 
246. See Gibson & Healey, supra note 45, at 381 n.78 (opining that the Mon-
tana court took the Cher decision too far). 
247. See supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text (discussing Booth and 
Namath). 
248. See supra part I.B.1.b (discussing commercial use). 
249. See supra note 175 and accompanying text (discussing Montana’s stipu-
lation that the Mercury News’ posters advertised the quality and content of the 
newspaper). 
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should have concluded the case for Montana.250  When a 
right of publicity case involves media “advertising” which 
may also be considered a product independent of its use to 
promote the media itself, courts must require a factual de-
termination of whether the advertising use or the use as a 
separate product predominates.251  If the merchandising use 
predominates, the right of publicity should prevail, and the 
media’s product should not be protected by the First 
Amendment.252 
C. The Montana Court Should Have Applied the Titan 
Sports Test 
In Titan Sports, where magazine publishers inserted 
poster-size photographs into their periodicals, the Second 
Circuit proposed a test to determine whether the posters 
were used for “purposes of trade.”253  Because Titan Sports 
did not involve the issue of the media promoting itself, the 
sole First Amendment question involved was whether the 
newsworthy exception applied to the poster-size photo-
graphs.254  Specifically, at issue was whether the conceded 
newsworthiness of the wrestlers allowed the magazines to 
fold posters into their publications, or whether the posters 
were inserted only for their commercial “purposes of 
trade.”255 
Unlike Titan Sports, Montana is complicated by the issue 
of media advertising.256  While the defendant magazines in 
Titan Sports maintained (and the trial court agreed) that the 
 
250. See, e.g., supra notes 198-212 (discussing Titan Sports, in which an appel-
late court reversed an entry of summary judgment for media defendants despite 
the plaintiff’s concession of newsworthiness). 
251. See supra part I.B.1.b (discussing commercial use); supra part I.C.2 (dis-
cussing media advertising); see also supra note 16 (reviewing the standard for 
summary judgment). 
252. See supra part I.B.1.b (discussing commercial use). 
253. See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text (discussing Titan Sports). 
254. See supra note 201 and accompanying text (discussing Titan Sports). 
255. See supra part I.B.1.b (discussing the term, “purposes of trade”). 
256. See supra note 180 and accompanying text (discussing Montana). 
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wrestling posters were part of the content of the maga-
zines,257 the Montana appellate court held that the Mercury 
News’ posters were promotional advertising incidental to 
production of the newspaper.258  Nevertheless, because Mon-
tana, like Titan Sports, involved posters produced and dis-
tributed by the media, Titan Sports is the most analogous 
case to Montana and should have influenced the California 
courts.  Instead, the California Court of Appeal cited only to 
cases more easily distinguishable than Titan Sports.259  None 
of those cases involved posters printed, produced, distrib-
uted, sold, or given away by the media.  The California ap-
pellate court, therefore, should have applied the Titan Sports 
test to Montana.260 
In applying the Titan Sports test to Montana, a trier of fact 
might have considered the history of the San Jose Mercury 
News’ advertising itself on posters which it sold or distrib-
uted to the public.  Because the Mercury News did regularly 
make posters of its pages, that factor might weigh in favor of 
the newspaper.261  Other considerations, however, might fa-
vor the plaintiff:  the posters’ distribution rather than “post-
ing” in public locations;262 the untraditional sale of advertis-
ing to the public;263 the posters’ suitability for framing or 
other use as a separate product; and the posters’ competing 
with products which are traditionally licensed.264  Further-
 
257. See supra note 206 and accompanying text (discussing the Titan Sports 
trial court’s findings). 
258. See supra note 180 and accompanying text (discussing the Montana ap-
pellate court’s ruling). 
259. See supra notes 234, 244 and accompanying text (discussing the inappli-
cability of the Montana appellate court’s analysis). 
260. See supra note 211 and accompanying text (discussing the Titan Sports 
test). 
261. See supra note 169 (noting the Mercury News’ regular practice of reprint-
ing the newspaper as promotional posters). 
262. See supra note 169 and accompanying text (discussing the Mercury 
News’ distribution of the posters). 
263. See supra note 169 and accompanying text (discussing the Mercury 
News’ sale of the posters). 
264. See supra note 4 (describing a competing poster of Montana). 
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more, because the Mercury News may continue to advertise, 
although without using posters portraying unauthorized 
names or likenesses, no speech will be quieted or 
“chilled.”265  Given these considerations to be had, summary 
judgment was an improper disposition in the Montana case, 
just as it was in Titan Sports.266  Because genuine issues of 
material fact existed,267 the California appellate court should 
have reversed the trial court’s order for summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Although well-paid entertainers and athletes are often 
criticized for capitalizing on their names and likenesses, 
there are legitimate policy reasons for protecting celebrities’ 
rights.  The Montana decision, by creating a precedent by 
which the media may infringe on publicity rights by mer-
chandising products which reprint previously newsworthy 
articles or photographs, has the potential to erode that right 
which legislators and courts have found worthy of protec-
tion.  Contrary to Montana, the free speech and free press 
clauses of the First Amendment should not protect the me-
dia’s merchandising of products, for whatever reason and 
regardless of whether or not the media seek a profit, when 
those products, if not merchandised by the media, would in-
fringe on an individual’s right of publicity. 
 
 
265. See supra part I.C.2 (describing permitted types of media advertising). 
266. See supra notes 208-09 (discussing the Second Circuit’s reversal of Titan 
Sports). 
267. See supra note 16 (explaining the standard for affirming summary 
judgment). 
